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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 
15432 
KARL J. STAVAR, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, the State of Utah, appeals from an 
order of the District Court granting respondent's motion to 
dismiss an action to remove respondent from public office 
for malfeasance in office. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent's motion to dismiss the action for 
removal from public office was granted as a matter of law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the order of dismissal 
and remand to the District Court for a trial on the merits of 
the accusation of malfeasance in office. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Utah Attorney General accused Karl J. Stavar, 
the appointed Chief of Police of Helper, Utah, of Malfeasance 
in Officer under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1953), as amended 
r 
in that: 
". • • during his term as Chief of 
Police said defendant did intentionally 
and knowingly breach the trust imposed upon 
him by virtue of his office to a substantial 
degree and in such way as to offend against 
the commonly accepted standards of a person 
in his office." (R. l) 
Defendant moved to dismiss the accusation arguing 
that he had not been convicted of any of the offenses 
enumerated in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (1953), as amended, and 
that only after a conviction on one of the aforementioned 
offenses can an action for removal be maintained under Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1953), as amended. 
After a hearing, the motion to dismiss was granted 
without prejudice for the following reasons: 
"l. That under § 77-7-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a 
conviction must precede the initiation 
of any action under § 77-7-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended; and 
2. That the accusation on file 
herein does not state facts with 
sufficient particularity to state a 
cause of action." (R.11) 
The State of Utah appeals to the Utah Supreme court i 
I 
from that dismissal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A CONVICTION FOR A CRIME IS NOT A PREREQUISITE 
TO INITIATION OF AN ACTION TO REMOVE A PUBLIC 
OFFICIAL, ESPECIALLY WHEN REMOVAL IS BASED UPON 
MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE. 
One of the most fundamental and basic principles 
of statutory construction is that if at all possible, 
statutes must be construed to give meaning to all relevant 
sections, to all paragraphs, to all sentences, and to all 
words. 
An equally basic corrollary rule of statutory 
construction requires that statutes be considered as a whole 
in context with all other relevant statutes in order to 
derive meaning consistent with all. 
In Totorien v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 
984 (1965), this Court was concerned with the interpretation 
of a statute on liens against property. The Court stated: 
"It needs no citation of 
authorities that whenever possible 
effect should be given to every 
part of an Act." Id. at 178. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 
485 P.2d 1035 (1971), the Court considered a statute involved 
intricately with basic constitutionally protected rights--the 
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forfeiture of a person's land for default in payments to the 
State. This Court held that each term of a statute must 
be given meaning: 
"Foundational rules require that 
we assume that each term of a statute 
was used advisedly •••• " Id. at 
102. (Emphasis added.) 
The above stated principles apply not only in 
civil cases but also in criminal. 
In State v. Gates, 118 Utah 182, 221 P.2d 878 
(1950), this Court considered the interpretation of a crimina'. 
statute making it a felony to pander, that is, to "induce, 
persuade, encourage ••• a female person to become a 
I 
prostitute." Id. at 184. The Court declared the principles I 
to be of the most basic in statutory construction: 
" •• [o]ne of the axiomatic 
rules of construction that every 
law, if possible, should be construed 
as-to give effect to all of its 
provisions." Id. at 188. (Emphasis 
added.) 
State v. Jester, 448 P.2d 917 (Wash. 1968), is exemplary of 
more recent application of the principles to criminal law. 
Many of the very recent cases concerning the 
principles simply refer to the older cases such as those 
cited above. Because this Court recognizes the principles 
as "axiomatic" and needing "no citation of authorities," 
appellant will not belabor the point by citing other of the 
myriad of cases applicable. 
-4-
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The District Court's holding flies directly in 
the face of the above mentioned fundamentals of statutory 
construction, and renders several important, related 
statutes totally meaningless. 
For example, the lower court's holding renders 
the words "malfeasance in office" in Utah Code Ann. § 
77-7-1 (1953), as amended (hereinafter 77-7-1),totally 
void, and assumes that the legislature's present use of 
those words is inadvised, useless, and without any effect. 
The lower court position is that action to remove a public 
official under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1953), as amended 
(hereinafter 77-7-2) must be preceded by a conviction for 
one of the matters stated in 77-7-1. 
77-7-2 states: 
"An action for the removal of 
any officer of a city, county, or 
other political subdivision of this 
state on grounds set forth in section 
77-7-1, may be commenced by presenting 
a sworn, written accusation to the 
district court. Such accusation may be 
initiated by any taxpayer, grand jury, 
or county attorney for the county in 
which the officer was elected or appointed, 
or by the attorney general." 
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77-7-1 states: 
"All officers of any city, 
county or other political sub-
division of this state not liable 
to impeachment shall be subject 
to removal as provided in this 
chapter upon being convicted of a 
felony, an indictable misdemeanor, 
a misdemeanor involving moral 
turpitude or malfeasance in office." 
If the lower court is correct, then the words 
"malfeasance in office" have no meaning whatsoever; there 
is no crime of malfeasance in office, so a conviction 
therefor is impossible. Defendant himself admitted, during 
argument before_ the District Court, that there is no crime 
of malfeasance and that those words "malfeasance in office" 
apparently have no meaning or effect. (Unfortunately, the 
District Court did not make record of the arguments and 
statements of counsel.) Clearly the District Court has 
disregarded the "axiomatic" principles stated above. 
Not only are the words "malfeasance in office" 
left without meaning, but all of Utah'Code Ann. § 77-7-16 
(1953), as amended (hereafter 77-7-16) is also rendered 
void or absurd by the court's interpretation. 77-7-16 
states: 
-6-
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"Nothing in this chapter 
shall be construed to prevent the 
officers mentioned from being 
proceeded against by information 
or indictment for a public offense 
in the same manner as is provided 
by law for so proceeding against 
other persons accused of a public 
offense." 
If a conviction for the offense must necessarily precede 
an action,as respondent asserts, then 77-7-16 would mean: 
even though one has obtained a conviction against a public 
official for an offense, and uses that conviction as a ground 
for removal, one can still proceed by indictment or informa-
tion to get another conviction on the same offense. That is 
absurd. If a conviction is necessary to initiate action to 
remove, then there is no need for a statute to allow the 
filing of indictments or informqtions concerning the same 
matter. The reading of all of the relevant sections together 
in order to give meaning to all, logically and inescapably 
requires an interpretation other than that of the lower court. 
Not only are the words "malfeasance in off ice" and 
all of Section 77-7-16 rendered meaningless, but other 
extremely important legislative words are totally emasculated 
by the position of the respondent in the lower court. 77-7-2 
provides for the initiation of removal proceeding by a taxpayer 
in addition to proceedings by county attorneys, the attorney 
general, etc. Appellant submits that the legislature allowed 
-7-
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taxpayer actions for removal as a check in the event that 
the public prosecuting officials, county attorneys and 
the attorney general, fail to do their duty because they are 
corrupt or otherwise. However, if the initiation of an actio: 
for removal must be preceded by a prosecution and conviction I 
for a crime, then the taxpayer can do nothing if the prosecut 
fail to do their duty and refuse to prosecute. The taxpayer 
check on prosecuting officials becomes a completely illusory I 
remedy, for the taxpayer cannot initiate and prosecute crimes, 
Not only are the words "malfeasance in office,• all 
of section 77-7-16, and the right of a taxpayer to initiate I 
action rendered meaningless, but all of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-7-4 (1953), as amended (hereafter 77-7-4), becomes absurd,] 
77-7-4 provides that the grounds for an accusation for removi!i 
can be found by a grand jury and presented to the county 
attorney. If a conviction for a crime is the only ground 
for removal, as the lower court held, then the grand jury 
contemplated by 77-7-4 would be convened and would take 
evidence on the sole issue of whether or not the convicted 
public official has been convicted. That a grand jury would 
have to be convened to deliberate on and determine whether tl' 
· d 'culo 
convicted official has been convicted approaches the r1 1 
Contrary to the lower court's holding, 77-7-4 gives the 
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impression that a grand jury may be called to look into the 
grounds for removal, that is, the possible commission (not 
conviction) of a crime, or the commission of malfeasance in 
office. Grand jury initiation of removal proceedings are 
also mentioned in 77-7-2. 
Not only are the words "malfeasance in office," 
all of section 77-7-16, the right of a taxpayer to check 
public officials, and the grand jury action to bring an 
accusation rendered meaningless, but the lower court's 
interpretation is in dissonance with the tone and tenor of 
the entire Chapter 7 of Title 77. The whole chapter provides 
an orderly mechanism for the removal of office. 77-7-1, et 
seq. provides for appearance of the accused. He may answer 
by denying the sufficiency of the accusation, any article 
therein or the truth of the accusation. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-7-6 and 77-7-7 (1953), as amended. A plea of guilty may 
be entered. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-10 (1953), as amended. If 
a plea of guilty is not entered a jury trial must be provided 
and trial proceed as with an indictment or information. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-11 (1953), as amended. The parties have the 
right to compulsory attendance of witnesses on their behalf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-12 (1953), as amended. "Upon a conviction" 
the court will pronounce judgment and enter an order removing 
the defendant from office after entering the causes for removal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-13 (1953), as amended. 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Chapter gives the impression of a complete 
procedure for trial on the substance of charges against 
an official, and not the introduction of a certified copy 
of conviction. The holding of the lower court flies in the 
face of the Chapter as a whole. 
Because the lower court's holding is inconsistent, 
the question becomes: is there a proper interpretation 
which does not assume that some words of the legislature 
have no meaning_, which does not assume that entire sections 
were used inadvisedly, which does give effect to every part 
of the act, and which is consistent with the tenor and logic 
of the entire Chapter? Appellant submits that the answer 
is yes, and that the following provides that interpretation: 
1) 77-7-2 states that the grounds for removal 
are those stated in 77-7-1. 
2) the grounds stated in 77-7-1 are a felony, 
one of the mentioned misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office, 
thus giving meaning to the words "Malfeasance in Office." 
3) The "conviction" mentioned in 77-7-1 is that 
conviction provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-13 (1953)' 
as amended (hereafter 77-7-13), after the jury trial and 
all of the safeguards provided in the whole of Chapter 7 
of Title 77. 77-7-13 states: 
-10-
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"Upon a conviction, the court 
must, at such time as it may appoint, 
pronounce judgment that the defendant 
be removed from office; but to warrant 
a removal a judgment must be entered 
and the causes of removal must be 
assigned therein." (Emphasis added.) 
4) Consistent with 77-7-1, only after a conviction 
under 77-7-13, for a felony, one of the mentioned misdemeanors, 
or malfeasance in office, may a judgment of removal be entered. 
5) If a prosecuting official refuses or fails to 
do his duty, then a taxpayer can bring an action alleging 
the commission of a felony, one of the stated misdemeanors, 
or malfeasance in office. 
6) A grand jury may be convened and may take 
evidence concerning the commission of a felony, one of the 
stated misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office. If the grand 
jury finds sufficient evidence, an accusation may be presented. 
7) If an action under 77-7-2 is filed by a grand 
jury, a taxpayer or a prosecutor alleging the commission of 
a felony; then, consistent with 77-7-16, the State may 
still proceed by indictment or information, to get a criminal 
conviction upon the same facts. 
-11-
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The above interpretation lends consistent, logical 
significance to all words and to all relevant sections of 
the law. 
I 
Even if this Court somehow should determine that the : 
word "conviction" in 77-7-1 requires a prior conviction in 
order for removal on grounds of conunission of a crime, the 
right to remove a public officer for malfeasance in offke 
must be preserved. At the very least the Court should 
hold .Jthat the word "conviction" in 77-7-1 applies only to the 
criminal matters stated therein, but not to malfeasance in 
office; that the conunis~ion of m~lfea~ance in office is 
a specific ground for removal which does not require an 
impossible prior conviction therefor. The words of the 
legislature must not be declared a nullity. 
This Court has long recognized the significance 
and importance of an action for removal for malfeasance in 
office. In State v. Gertz, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 
(1961), this Court specifically considered 77-7-2 after 
removal of a city conunissioner for malfeasance in office. 
This Court specifically recognized the wise and important 
legislative purpose in the use of the words "malfeasance 
in office." In speaking specifically about malfeasance, 
the Court stated: 
-12-
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"From a survey of the 
chapter (77-7 UCA 1953) it 
appears that the legislature 
thought the interests of the 
public in combating corruption 
in public off ice require an 
expeditious procedure for the 
removal of public officers who 
betray their trusts." Id. at 350. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Court held that malfeasance in office was 
not a criminal proceeding, but "quasi-criminal." Id. at 350. 
The Court recognized that malfeasance in office 
was a specific ground for removal from office under 77-7-2, 
and defined malfeasance as follows: 
"On the contrary, by usage 
the phrase 'malfeasance in office' 
has acquired a commonly understood 
meaning: It requires an iriteriticirial 
act or omission relcitinq to the 
duties of a pub1ic office, which .. 
amounts to a: crime, or which TnvolVes 
a substantial breach of the trust 
imposed upon the official by the 
nature of his office, and which 
conduct is of such a: character as· 'to 
offend against the comiliorily acc·epl::ed 
standards of honesty and moralTty." 
Id. at 348.(Emphasis added.) 
Appellant submits that the legislature used the words 
"malfeasance in office" for a specific wise purpose and 
that to declare those words meaningless,as the lower court 
has, would be not only improper according to principles of 
-13-
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construction, but also against the public welfare. 
If the prior interpretation of 77-7-1 et seq. 
by appellant is somehow deemed improper, appellant submits 
that at least the following would be consistent with the 
public interest and principles of construction: 
1) 77-7-2 states grounds for removal are those 
stated in 77-7-1. 
2) The grounds_ stated in 77-7-1 are: a conviction I 
for a felony or one of the stated misdemeanors or {the commis·I 
sion of) malfeasance in office as defined by State v. Gertz, I 
supra. 
3) A taxpayer may bring an action for malfeasance 
if prosecuting officials fail to act. 
4) A grand jury may look at allegations and 
evidence of malfeasance in office. 
5) Consistent with 77-7-16, if an accusation for 
removal on the grounds of malfeasance in office is brought, 
prosecutors may also proceed by indictment or information 
upon related facts. 
Again, all sections are given meaning, nothing is 
rendered a nullity, and the public policy of protection 
against corruption is preserved. 
-14-
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE 
ACCUSATION FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR FAILING 
TO SET FORTH FACTS WITH SUFFICIENT 
PARTICULARITY TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The lower court also granted defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss on the ground that "the accusation on file 
herein does not state facts with sufficient particularity 
to state a cause of action." (R.11). 
77-7-2 provides that the accusatory pleading in 
an action for removal is an "accusation:" 
"An accusation is writing 
against any district, county, 
precinct or municipal officer •• " 
77-7-4 again talks in terms of an accusation: 
"When found by the grand 
jury, the accusation must be presented 
by the foreman. • • • " 
The accusation in the present"case-conforms in every respe~t 
to the Utah statutory pleading requirements. The most general 
statute relevant to this issue is Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-1 
(1953), as amended, which details necessary elements in 
complaints before magistrates. The last paragraph of 
Section 77-11-1 reads as follows: 
"However, in cases of public 
offenses triable upon information, 
indictment or accusation, the complaint, 
the right to a bill of particulars, and 
all proceedings and matters in relation 
-15-
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thereto, shall conform to and be 
governed by the provisions of the New 
Chapters 21 and 23 of Title 77, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Turning to Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-8 (1953), as 
amended (hereafter 77-21-8), made applicable to accusation 
pleading through the above quoted section 77-11-1, the 
offense may be charged in ~ or more of the following ways: 
"(a) By using the name given 
to the offense by the common law or 
by a statute. 
(b) By stating so much of the 
definition of the offense, either in 
terms of the common law or of the 
statute defining the offense or. in 
terms of substantially the same meaning, 
as is sufficient to give the court and 
the defendant notice of what offense is 
intended to be charged." (Emphasis added. l 
The accusation in the instant case need only conform 
to subsection (a) or to subsection (b) of the above statute, 
The accusation herein conforms to both subsection (al and 
subsection (b). 
The accusation was phrased in the following terms: 
"COMES NOW the State of Utah 
and by and through Robert R. Wallace, 
Assistant Attorney General, pursuant 
to Title 77, Chapter 7, Section 2, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, 
accuses Karl J. Stavar, duly appointed 
Chief of Police for the City of Helper, 
County of Carbon, State of Utah, of 
-16-
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committing Malfeasance in Office, 
in that during his term as Chief 
of Police said defendant did 
intentionally and knowingly breach 
the trust imposed upon him by virtue 
of his office to a substantial degree 
and in such a way as to offend against 
the commonly accepted standards of a 
person in his office." (R. 1). 
The accusation uses the "name of the offense" 
in accordance with subsection (a) of 77-21-8. At that 
point the law is satisfied. However, appellant also 
included the definition in "terms of substantially the 
same meaning" in accordance with subsection (b) of 77-21-8. 
This definition in terms of substantially the same meaning 
was taken almost word for word from the definition of 
malfeasance used by this Court in State v. Gertz, supra at 13. 
The court stated the following about that definition: 
"It is our opinion that the 
phrase is sufficiently definite to 
enable people of ordinary intelligence 
and understanding to know what conduct 
is required or prohibited and that it 
is, therefore, not so vague or uncertain 
as to be invalid." Id. at 348. 
However, if the defendant was unaware by the 
face of the pleading of what he was accused, a very detailed 
bill of particulars could have been provided. The right 
to a bill of particulars is specifically made applicable to 
an accusation in 77-11-1 quoted above, and bills of par-
~iculars are provided for in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-21-6 and 
77-21-7 (1953), as amended. 
-17-
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Appellant offered to provide a bill of particulars 
to the defense during arguments to the court. The arguments 
were not recorded, however, the record only states that 
arguments were made (Tr.9). 
CONCLUSION 
A conviction for a crime is not the only grounds 
for bringing an action to remove public officers. Officers 
may also be removed by following the detailed procedures of 
Chapter 7 of Title 77 upon an accusation that the public 
official has committed malfeasance in office. To hold that 
a conviction must precede a removal action violates axiomatic 
principles of statutory construction, violates sound reason· 
ing, and violates public policy to stop corruption in public 
office. 
The accusation on file conforms to two requirements 
of the law concerning the specificity of accusations, when 
either one of the two would have sufficed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
ROBERT R. WALLACE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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